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RETHINKING ERISA's PROMISE OF INCOME SECURITY IN
A WORLD OF 401(K) PLANS
LAWRENCE

A. FROLIK*

This article discusses the evolution of retirement income funds from defined
benefit packages to 401(k) and IRA accounts and how the changing
dynamic has reshapedthe way retirees think about post-retirementincome.
The article outlines the mechanics of 401(k) accounts and rolloverIRAs in
the post-retirement period and presents questions about the ability of
retirees to successfully address the complex issues relating to investment
choices including, what entity they entrust their savings to, the volume and
source of distributions, and long-term sufficiency planning. The article
suggests that an increase in the use of annuities may help to resolve some
of the challengesfaced by today's retirees.

I.

THE DECLINE OF THE DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN.

Over the last twenty years the number of defined benefit plans has
steadily declined; as of 2011, fewer than twenty percent of all employees
participated in one. Defined benefit plans are being replaced by defined
contribution plans: more specifically, 401(k) plans in the private sector,
403(b) plans by tax exempt organizations or public schools, and 457(b)
plans for some state and local governmental employees. 2 (For brevity, these
plans will collectively be referred to as 401(k) plans.) Participation in
401(k) plans has steadily risen so that over fifty percent of employees
participate in one.3 The dollar amount saved in those accounts is
Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University
of
Pittsburgh School of Law.
1 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR. STATISTICS, The Last Private Industry Pension
Plans,(2013), http://stats.bls.gov/opub/ted/2013/ted 20130103.htm.
2 The plans take their names from the Internal Revenue
Code sections that
govern them: I.R.C. § 401(k) (2010), I.R.C. §§ 403(b), 457(b) (2008).
3 William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-Based
Retirement Benefits, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2011),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar0Ipl.htm.
*
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astounding. As of December 2010, defined contribution plans held $4.5
trillion.4
Employers often cite investment risk as a compelling reason for
abandoning defined benefit plans and replacing them with 401(k) plans.
Employers who sponsor a defined benefit plan must annually fund it with
the amount due based on several variables, including the probable amount
of the defined benefit or pension owed to each retiring employee, the life
expectancy of the retired employees and other plan beneficiaries, and the
expected investment return on the plan assets. The latter, the return on the
plan investments, can cause the greatest year-to-year variance in the
employer's required annual plan contribution. The higher the investment
return, the fewer dollars that the employer must contribute to the plan.
During years of high interest rates on bonds and strong returns on stocks,
the employer may need to contribute little or nothing to the plan. But in
years of low interest rates on bonds and losses from stock investments, the
employer will have to make significant contributions in order to keep the
plan actuarially fully funded. Over time, of course, the good investment
years and the bad investment years off-set each other, so that over the life
of the plan, the pension fund should have an acceptable average return.
"Over time," however, provides little comfort to the employer during the
years of poor or negative investment returns, which will mandate greater
employer contributions to the plan. It is that short-term risk, which may
not be all that "short," that employers, or more accurately, the corporate
executives, fear.
The swings in the plan investment return and the corresponding
changes in the required employer annual contribution affect the employer's
annual profit because the plan contributions are expenses that reduce
income. Worse, the employer will likely be forced to make greater
contributions in years when the economy is doing poorly, causing the
investment returns to lag. Moreover, if the economy is performing poorly,
the employer's business may also be suffering. Faced with lower revenues
and declining profits, the employer will be required to make larger
contributions to the plan, thereby further depressing profits.
In response, employers have turned to defined contribution plans,
specifically 401(k) accounts, which do not promise a pension or other form
Co. FACT BOOK 102 (5 1st ed. 2011).
For a detailed discussion on why employers prefer defined contribution plans
to defined benefit plans, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution
4 INV. CO. INST., 2011 INv.
5

Paradigm,114 YALEL.J. 451 (2004).
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of assured retirement benefit, but only promise the participating employee
that the employer will make contributions to the employee's 401(k)
account. The employee is then responsible for investing the funds in the
401(k) account. Because the success of those investments largely
determines the value of the account at the time the employee retires, the
investment risk is shifted from the employer to the employee. Moreover,
the employer has a fixed, predictable cost because its contribution is
usually a percentage of the employees' pay for those employees who
choose to participate.
This shift of the investment risk to the employee is well
understood, as well as the risk of participation, the risk of not participating
at the maximum degree allowed by the plan, and the risk of borrowing
from the 40 1(k) account. Post-retirement risks faced by 40 1(k) participants
has failed to gamer much attention.7 The realities of the post-retirement
world create substantial risks that threaten to lead to the impoverishment of
many elderly retirees.
II.

THE RISE OF THE ROLLOVER INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ACCOUNT

Upon retirement, employees who own a 401(k) account have the
option of leaving their account in the employer's 401(k) plan or, as most
do, rolling it over, tax-free, into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA)."
In 2011 rollover IRAs had a total value of $4.7 trillion. 9 (In this paper,
retiree defined benefits retirement accounts, whether remaining in the
40 1(k) or rolled over into an IRA, will be referred to as IRAs.)

Joellen Leavelle, BorrowingAgainst the Future with a 401 (k Loan, PENSION
RIGHTS CTR. (Apr. 12, 2013), www.pensionrights.org/blog/borrowing-against6

future-401k-loan; James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal
Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 748-49 (2011). Most

retirees will also have insufficient funds in their 401(k) account to support an
adequate income during retirement. See James Kwak, Improving Retirement
Savings Optionsfor Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 489 (2013).
But see Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting
401(k) Accounts Into Federally GuaranteedLifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 277 (2010).
I.R.C. § 402(c)(2) (2005).
9 INV. CO. INST., supra note 4.
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Whether they leave their funds in the 40 1(k) or roll them over into
an IRA, retirees face formidable financial planning hurdles.' 0 They must
successfully invest the IRA for what is likely to be twenty or more years of
their remaining lives, as the average life expectancy at age sixty-five is
about nineteen years for men and twenty-one years for women." For many,
post-retirement will last much longer, as about twenty-five percent of
today's sixty-five-year-olds will live past age ninety and ten percent, a
majority of whom will be women, will live past age ninety-five .12 To
maintain the value of their retirement fund during their retirement years,
retirees must successfully invest it, which at a minimum means earning an
investment return at least equal to the rate of inflation. As the financial
collapse of the markets in 2001 and 2008 demonstrated, however, even that
modest goal may be difficult to achieve. For example, the Dow Jones
Industrial average in September 2008, was 13,896. In February 2009, it
was 7,069, and in February 2013, it had reached 13,973. Thus, ignoring
possible dividends, an investor whose stock portfolio resembled the Dow
Jones Industrial Average would have had essentially zero returns for the
five-year period from February 2008 to February 2013. Nor would our
investor have fared much better by investing in bonds. From 2003 to
February 2013, the Vanguard Total Bond fund yielded 5.2 percent, but
because inflation from 2002 through 2012 was 2.63 percent, the real annual
return on the bonds was less than three percent.' 3
Second, retirees must spend their retirement fund at a rate that will
not exhaust it before they die, yet take a sufficient amount out that, when
added to their other sources of income such as Social Security, will enable
them to live at the level that they deem adequate. Taking money out of a
10 Even the decision of whether and where to roll over the funds raises difficult
choices for retirees. According to the Government Accounting Office, "401(k) plan
participants separating from their employers must decide what to do with their plan
savings. Many roll over their plan savings to IRAs. As GAO previously reported,
there is concern that participants may be encouraged to choose rollovers to IRAs in
lieu of options that could be more in their interests." U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, GAO-13-30, 401(K) PLAN: LABOR AND IRS COULD IMPROVE THE
ROLLOVER PROCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS (2013).
Soc.
SEC,
Calculators: Life
Expectancy, available at

11

http://www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
12

Id.

13 VANGUARD,

Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund Admiral Shares,

https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?Fundld=0584&FundlntExt=INT
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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retirement account can be even trickier than being a successful investor.
Although the two goals (investment returns that at a minimum keep pace
with inflation, and taking distributions at a rate that neither exhausts the
fund nor leaves the retiree in poverty) can support each other - good
investing means more to spend while tempered withdrawals maintain
capital - the two goals are also in conflict. The more the retiree withdraws
to live on, the less there will be to invest, which will result in less available
income in later years.
The percent of the fund that can be taken out each year without
exhausting the fund before death is surprisingly low. The current
conventional wisdom is to withdraw no more than four percent of the initial
fund plus annual increases for inflation.14 Following that advice would
mean that a retiree with an IRA of $1,000,000 on the first day of retirement
could take out only $40,000 the first year. Even if the retiree was willing to
risk exhaustion of the fund by taking out at a rate of five percent, the IRA
would yield only $50,000 a year. 15
Other factors also diminish the income security of a retiree with a
401(k) account. The right upon retirement to take funds from the 401(k)
account creates the potential temptation not to save the funds, but to spend
them or use them to pay off existing debts.16 For many retirees, the right
upon retirement to take money out of their 401(k) plan is the first time in
See, e.g., Gregg S. Fisher, What Portfolio Withdrawal Rate Can You Live
With? (Dec. 5, 2012, 2:13 PM), FORBES, available at http://www.forbes.com/
14

sites/greggfisher/2012/12/05/what-portfolio-withdrawal-rate-can-you-live-with/
("Our research points to 4% as being a reasonable starting point for a withdrawal
rate. Investors should also consider age, health, and other individual-specific issues
in determining whether their own withdrawal rate should in fact be lower than this,
or possibly higher. But historically, investors with diversified balanced portfolios
who took a total return approach to managing their investments in retirement were
able to make this 4%withdrawal rate quite consistently.").
15 Taking out at a rate of 4%may be too optimistic. The U.S. Department of
Labor provides an income calculator that estimates the amount of income that can
safely be taken from a retirement account. The calculator uses a rate of interest
equal to the 10-year constant maturity Treasury securities rate, which, as of
December 3, 2012 was equal to 1.63%, meaning that $1,000,000 of retirement
savings would produce only $16,300 per year. See Lifetime Income Calculator,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/lifetimeincomecalculator.html

(last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
16 Colleen E. Medill, The Retirement DistributionDecision Ten Years Later:
Results from an EmpiricalStudy, 16

ELDER L.J.

295, 316 (2009).
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their lives they have access to what seems to them to be significant wealth.
The temptation is great to spend some of it and so reward themselves for
forty-five years of daily toil. Spending any substantial amount of their
lump-sum payout, however, will severely affect their future financial wellbeing. We do not know how often recently retired employees spend part of
their 40 1(k) accounts, but common sense tells us that many may buy a boat
or a car or take a special vacation as they celebrate their retirement. Some
undoubtedly spend a significant percentage of their 401(k) accounts by
"investing" in a better house or vacation home. Others will have debts that
they will need to pay off. 7 Regardless of how much is spent or what it is
spent on, however, the result is a diminution in future disposable income.
III.

WHY PENSIONS ARE PREFERABLE TO 40 1(K) ACCOUNTS

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which
was enacted to protect the retirement income of employees, was reasonably
successful when defined benefit plans prevailed and when retirement plans
paid retirees a lifetime pension. In today's world, however, where defined
contribution plans are in the majority, 401(k) plans prevail, and ERISA
"income security" ends at retirement when retired employees roll over their
401(k) accounts into IRAs. Once the retiree funds the IRA, ERISA
protection ends.' As a result, many of America's retirees will encounter
hard times during their retirement.
Consider the meaning of ERISA's commitment to "income
security." The purpose of ERISA was to help ensure that retirees would
receive the retirement benefits promised to them, which in 1974 typically
meant a pension paid by a defined benefit plan. ERISA was not enacted as
a means of creating wealth for workers that they could pass on to their
descendants as a legacy. ERISA was enacted to help assure that retirees
would have a dependable source of retirement income that, along with
Social Security retirement benefits, would provide economic security

17

Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The

Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations,
44 HARV. J. ONLEGIS.167, 168 (2007).

s IRAs are not governed by the qualified retirement plan regulation of I.R.C.
§ 401(c). They are governed by I.R.C. § 408. See I.R.C. § 408 (2005); I.R.C. §
401(c) (2004).
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during their retirement.19 When ERISA was enacted, defined contribution
plans, though permitted, were in the minority.20 When workers had a
choice, as when negotiating their retirement benefits through collective
bargaining, they overwhelmingly bargained for a pension as the best way
of creating a financially secure retirement. They preferred a pension
because they wanted to replace the loss of income occasioned by
retirement, particularly when retirement was often not voluntary but
imposed by a mandated retirement age, most commonly age sixty-five. 2 1
The concept of the need to replace lost income due to retirement is
the foundation of American retirement financial security. The most basic
source of income security is the nearly universal Social Security tax on
22
wages, which supports an old age pension.22 Intended as a replacement of
income lost due to retirement, its benefits are directly tied to the amount of
wages earned during the retiree's working years, with the benefit calculated
as a percentage replacement of the highest thirty-five years of earned
income that was subject to the Social Security wage tax.23 Social Security
is not a promise of a minimum income for every retiree. That function is
performed by the Supplemental Security Income program that pays a
modest benefit - in 2013, $710 a month for a single individual or $8,520 a
year - and is best perceived as an anti-poverty program that provides a very
modest degree of financial security.24 In contrast, in 2013, the maximum
19 James A. Wooten, A Legislative and PoliticalHistory ofERISA Preemption,
Part 1, 14 J. PENS. BEN. 31, 32 (2006); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA
Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 427,

443-46 (1987) (describing the pension failures that gave rise to the enactment of
ERISA).
20

Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L.

REV. 433, 448-49 (2010).
21 Until the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967
(29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1974)), most employers had the right to terminate
employees because of their age.
22 The benefit is payable at age 66 to those eligible. There is no requirement
that the recipient retire in order to collect benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2004).
23 David Pratt, Retirement in a Defined Contribution Era: Making the Money
Last, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1091, 1125 (2008); Soc. SEC. Frequently Asked

Questions, (Dec. 26, 2013), https://faq.ssa.gov/ics/support/KBAnswer.asp?
questionlD=1989&hitOffset=65+36+35+27+23+19+18+13+11+10+8+4+3&docI
D=4533.
24

Soc.

SEC,

SSI

Federal

Payment

Amounts

http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/cola/SSI.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).

for
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Social Security monthly benefit for a worker retiring at age sixty-six was
$2,533 or $30,396 a year, which is a replacement percentage of almost
twenty-seven percent of the maximum amount of earnings of $113,700
subject to the Social Security wage tax.25
Employment based pensions, when added to Social Security
benefits, were expected to create enough income to permit the retiree to
live comfortably. In recognition of the retiree's receipt of Social Security
benefits, in calculating the amount of the retiree's pension, the retirement
plan can be "integrated" with Social Security; that is, Social Security
benefits can be taken into account. 26 The right to create a pension benefit
formula in light of Social Security benefits only emphasizes how pensions
are a means of income replacement. To the extent that Social Security has
already replaced lost income, an employer provided pension is relieved of
that obligation.
When it became apparent that employer promises of pensions
would often not be fulfilled, Congress enacted ERISA. It was meant to
strengthen workers' rights by imposing fiduciary obligations on plan
administrators and mandate adequate funding to increase the likelihood that
pensions would not just be promised, but actually paid. The Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was also created to provide
assurance that if the plan was unable to meet its pension obligations, at
least some of the lost pension income would be replaced.27 With the certain
payment of Social Security and the relative security of pension payments,
retirees were supposedly assured income for life.
The replacement of defined benefit pensions with 401(k) plans,
however, has resulted in an upending of the original goal of income
replacement. While 401(k) accounts are often criticized for moving the
risk of investment from the employer to the employee, that is only part of
the problem arising from the abandonment of pensions. Far more
depressing, at least for retirees, has been the end of the national

25

Soc.

SEC.,

Frequently

Asked

Questions

(Jan.

7,

2014),

http://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/What-160-are-160-the-maximum160-taxable-earnings-amounts-and-the-Social-Security-tax-rate-for-2013.

See generally Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement
Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1063, 1136-79 (1997).
27
Clare Staub, Fiduciary Liability Issues in ERISA Pension Plan
Terminations, 11 HOUS. Bus. & TAX. L. J. 427, 430 (2011).
26
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commitment to a guaranteed stream of income secured by ERISA funding
requirements, plan administrator fiduciary obligations, and the PBGC.
Rather than promoting retirement income, a 401(k) plan promises
the accumulation of a fund that the retiree may draw down and live on
during retirement. While in theory a 401(k) plan should be able to serve as
a secure source of income in retirement, in reality it will usually not. The
difference between a pension - a set amount of annual income for life and a lump sum that can be converted into a stream of income by annual
distributions, is so great that to say that a 401(k) is a replacement for a
pension is like saying that an orange is a substitute for an apple because
both are fruits. Yes, both a pension and a 401(k) represent a form of
wealth, and both can be converted into goods and services in the same way
that both oranges and apples can be converted in caloric energy. Other
than both providing the opportunity for consumption, however, there is
simply no resemblance between a pension and a 401(k) account. The
former represents a form of income replacement, while the latter, the
401(k), is a form of wealth accumulation. And while it is true that wealth
can be used to replace income, it is not at heart income. Wealth must be
managed, invested and husbanded in order for it to produce income during
the many years of retirement.
The essence of a pension is its dependable and repetitive nature, so
that every dollar received can be used to purchase goods and services,
because another dollar, i.e., next month's pension payment, is on the way.
That is the good news. The bad news is that the pension benefit is fixed
and usually not adjusted to reflect a loss of purchasing power due to
inflation, and the death of the pensioner, or the spouse of the pensioner,
terminates the benefits. (Though many pensions pay until the last to die of
the worker or the worker's spouse, for convenience this paper will refer
only to a single pensioner.) Because an ERISA pension is non-assignable
and cannot be sold,28 a pension has no present value.
A 401(k) account is the opposite of a pension. Once transferred to
an IRA, the funds are assignable, have a present value and maintain that
value at the death of the retiree. But the funds, once spent, are forever
gone. Every dollar spent is a dollar that will not be replaced. In short, a
pension is income, a 401(k) account is wealth. And yes, income can be
converted into wealth by not spending it, just as wealth, if spent, can be
converted into income. But to save pension income in order to create
28 29

U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006).
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wealth means the loss of current consumption, which defeats the very
reason for the pension - the replacement of income loss due to retirement.
And to spend the wealth in a 40 1(k) plan to create income defeats the core
advantage of wealth, the possibility of future consumption either by the
current owner of the wealth or by a designated successor.
Pensions, which offer the certainty of income over the life of the
retiree or pensioner, meet the challenge of how to pay a fixed level of
income for an unknown number of years without assuming any additional
funding after the commencement of the pension. There is no risk of
running out of income for a retiree because that risk is borne by the payer
of the pension, or more correctly the risk is reduced to the risk of the payer
not being able to pay the pension because of actuarial miscalculations,
lower-than-expected investment returns, or the plan sponsor encountering
financial difficulties and so not making required contributions to the plan.
If we conceive of the pension as being a pooling of individual
retirement funds by all of the pensioners - albeit contributed by the
employer and not the workers - the promise of lifetime income is possible
only because of the insurance aspect of the fund. Pensions are a form of
pooled risk; the promise of lifetime income to all participants is possible
only because of differential dates of death by the participants. Some
pensioners will outlive their life expectancy and so receive more value in
annual distributions than would be called for based on the dollars that their
employer contributed to the pension plan for that individual. Other
pensioners will die before their expected life expectancy and so never
realize the value of the dollars that were contributed to the fund on their
behalf Those who die before their expected time not only collect a
pension for fewer years; they also forfeit what they "paid" to their pension
in the form of foregone wages. To the extent their wages were reduced, as
the employer shifted their compensation from current wage income to
future pension income, pensioners who die early experience an actual loss
of lifetime disposable income compared to workers whose employer did
not reduce their wages to contribute to a pension plan. In short, a worker
enrolled in a pension plan is betting that he or she will live long enough to
recapture the loss of current wages in the form of pension income.
A 40 1(k) account that is rolled over into IRA is the antithesis of the
pension plan's pooled risk; each retiree individually bears the risk of living
beyond his or her life expectancy and so exhausting the IRA. The
uncertainty of when death may occur and the "risk" of a long life means a
retiree cannot spend all of his or her IRA and must hold back some of it in
order to guarantee that the fund will not be exhausted before death,
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meaning that not all the 401(k) account is available for consumption during
retirement.
The uncertainty of when death will occur and the lack of "income
insurance" for the long-living retiree results in a pension having a greater
worth than an IRA of a similar dollar value. On the first day of retirement,
if a pension is discounted back to present value, and that value is equal to
the present value of a rollover IRA, the pension will provide more annual
income for consumption than the IRA because, unlike the IRA, every dollar
of the pension is available for consumption. A pension plan, which has
sufficient participants to effectively spread the actuarial risk, can calculate
the annual payoff that will exhaust the allocated capital for each participant
at the average expected date of death of the plan participants knowing that
the "early" deaths of participants and the resultant savings of capital will
counterbalance the "late" deaths and so ensure sufficient funds to pay every
participant a pension for life. The ability to payout all of the capital is what
makes a pension inherently more valuable in terms of consumption to a
retiree than a rollover IRA, which the retiree cannot spend down to zero
because the retiree does not know when death will occur.
Of course, by not spending all the capital in an account, the IRA
owner has funds to pass on after death. The dollar amount of what is
passed on will be an actual number, but the value to the IRA owner of
passing on funds to another will vary according to the value to the IRA
owner of leaving a legacy. Some place a high value on doing so, while
others prefer to consume more of the IRA during their life rather than
passing that consumption opportunity as a legacy on to another.
The legacy advantage of an IRA is not unique, however, because it
can be achieved by a pensioner by the purchase of life insurance.
Assuming upon retirement that the pensioner is insurable, he or she can
purchase life insurance, whose annual premium will reduce consumption
but ensure a legacy. By doing so, a pensioner might end up with a level of
annual consumption that is close to the amount of an annual distribution
from an IRA that can safely be taken out over the life of the owner.
Similarly, an IRA owner can capture the value of a pension by using the
IRA to purchase an immediate pay, lifetime annuity, but the transaction
costs associated with purchasing an annuity and the conservative future rate
of interest assumed by the seller of the annuity will likely result in a lower
annual payment than if the same amount in the IRA had been contributed
annually to a defined benefit plan and used to finance an annual pension.
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It is not the marginally lower return of an individually purchased
annuity, however, that accounts for the lack of purchases by IRA owners.29
Scholars of behavioral economics tell us that a variety of psychological
traits, such as hyper-discounting of future income, the common reluctance
to exchange a very large amount of money for a future stream of income,
over-confidence as to the ability to invest, excessive optimism as to rate of
return on investments, and underestimating life expectancy, are so deeply
inured that it is unlikely that immediate pay annuities will ever find a
significant market with IRA owners.3 0 The result is that most IRA owners
do not purchase an annuity and so must manage their accounts during their
retirement.
HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE RETIREES IN MANAGING A
ROLLOVER IRA?

IV.

Upon retirement, the individual can rollover a 401(k) account into
a tax-free IRA. 3 1 A retiree who decides to rollover a 40 1(k) account into an
IRA must decide where to roll over the funds. There is no shortage of
choices; mutual funds, banks, investment advisors, and investment
companies all compete for 401(k) accounts dollars, which is hardly a
surprise given the opportunity for fees and commissions for the custodian
of the IRA. We know very little as to how employees choose the
repository of a 401(k) rollover. We do not know if they compare costs in
the form of fees and commissions, whether they look closely at the
investment return, seek safety from fraud or embezzlement, or search out
low or high risk investments. Perhaps they just respond to advertisements
or merely follow advice from a friend or relative.
We do know that the choice of the investment vehicle is crucial in
terms of the investment return. Retirees who choose unwisely may suffer
diminished income in their twenty or thirty years of retirement. We also
know that the choice is not "one and done." Hopefully, over time the
retiree gains investment sophistication and invests the account more wisely
than at the time of the rollover. Unfortunately, inertia usually wins out
Wei-Yin Hu & Jason S. Scott, Behavioral Obstacles in the Annuity
Market,
63 FiN. ANALYSTS J. 71, 79 (2007).
30 See generally GARY BELSKY & THOMAS GILOVICH, WHY
SMART PEOPLE
29

MAKE BIG MONEY MISTAKES -AND HOW TO CORRECT THEM: LESSONS FROM THE
NEW SCIENCE OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2010).
31

I.R.C. § 402(c)(2) (2006).
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over wisdom (assuming that retirees gain investment skill as they age) so
that the initial investment decisions are unlikely to be changed.3 2
Of course, the need to make successful investment choices is not
new, as the employee faced the same decisions when working. What is
new is that the retired employee will be withdrawing funds from the
account, or at least the annual minimum distribution that is required after
age seventy and a half 3 3
The required minimum distribution rules, as well as the practical
need to take distributions to provide additional income, raise a number of
difficult decisions for the IRA owner. Each year the owner must decide
from which assets to take distributions. There are several options,
including distributing the most risky assets first, proportional distribution
by asset, and either first liquidating equities or the fixed income
investments. After each distribution, and in light of past investment
returns, the IRA owner faces the choice of whether to adjust the asset
allocation. The number and complexity of the choices raised by the need to
make annual distributions strongly suggests that many older retirees will
not be up to the task.
A retiree who owns an IRA faces confusing choices because the
"right" answers are dependent on uncertain variables, including future
interest rates, future stock prices, the rate of inflation, future income needs,
and the life expectancy of the retiree and the retiree's spouse. Of course,
investors of any age can guess wrong as to the direction of the stock market
or future interest rates, but a wrong choice by a retiree may result in a loss
of capital: a possibly irreversible choice that may significant lower future
distributions.
Given the number of variables that impact retirees' choices as to
how to manage their rollover IRAs, it is unlikely that most are making
optimum decisions. Even if they make a wise decision, it is not a final
decision. Each year a new retiree can make new mistakes. This repeated
need to make difficult investment decisions continues throughout the
retiree's life - stretching from retirement at age sixty-five to age eightyfive, ninety-five or even one hundred. Does anyone really think that most
ninety-five-year-olds are up to the task of managing an IRA?
See Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation,
103 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1, 15-16 (1995).
33 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-9 (2011)
(portraying A-2, Uniform Lifetime Table).
32
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DIMINISHED PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CAPACITY

V.

Much has been written about how employees lack the ability to
sensibly invest their 401(k) accounts during their working years.34 They
also fail to contribute as much as they might, too often borrow from the
account, and some even deplete it long before retirement by taking
hardship distributions.35 The failure to fully participate, lack of investment
acumen, and leakage during working years are all significant drawbacks of
401(k) accounts, yet they fail to capture another inherent fundamental flaw.
Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the inability of many
retirees to successfully manage their rollover retirement IRA funds during
the long years of their retirement.36 Retirees typically face twenty to thirty
years of retirement. During those many years they must continue to
successfully invest and manage an IRA. Unfortunately, during their
retirement years most retirees are in physical and mental decline, which
erodes their investment skills and diminishes the probability that they will
successfully manage their retirement account.
Physical decline is a normal part of aging. The loss of hearing,
senous vision impairment, loss of physical energy, and loss of short-term
memory are all too common with those aged seventy-five and older.37 The
degree of decline varies greatly from individual to individual. Some
experience only modest physical decline, such as diminished eyesight or
loss of hearing. Others suffer from a general loss of energy and growing
frailty. A few will suffer serious declines in short-term memory, others
will have significant vision problems, such as macular degeneration, and
many will have impaired hearing even if they use a hearing aid. It is
difficult to believe that those with serious physical declines can
successfully manage an IRA. If, because of failing vision, you have
difficulty or cannot read, you cannot effectively review your IRA reports.
E.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees,
15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 483 (2013); Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(ks, 49 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 53 (2012).
35 Thomas Olson, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the
Shift to Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 462-65
(2013).
34

36

One exception is Pratt, supra note 23, at 1137-42.

Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Lawyering: Representing Seniors in Light of
Cognitive Changes Accompanying Aging, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1081, 1091-98
(2013); Frolik, supra note 7, at 292-97.
37
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Poor hearing may mean you do not hear the advice given to you, mishear it,
or avoid meetings with advisors because of your difficulty in hearing. If
your short-term memory has severely declined and you have trouble
reading because of vision problems, you simply will not be able to make
considered decisions. Add to this a general loss of vigor, and it becomes
apparent that many very old IRA owners are not capable of active,
reasoned management of their account.
Chronic illness is the fate of many elderly. They suffer from
conditions such as diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and congestive heart
failure, which rob them of the energy and concentration needed to be a
sophisticated investor. Consider an eighty-year-old woman suffering from
end stage renal disease, who travels to the dialysis center three days a
week. On the other days of the week, is she really going to devote her
limited time and energy to her financial affairs? Will she have the
concentration and energy to do so? Other elderly persons experience acute
illnesses such as cancer, that leave them in pain, disoriented by drugs or
other therapies, and much more concerned about whether they will live
than whether their IRA is overloaded with equities or worried about which
assets should be sold to provide cash for the annual required minimum
distribution.
Even more chilling is the specter of millions of IRA owners who
suffer progressive dementia. It is estimated that up to half of those age
eighty-five or older suffer from dementia.38 At its most severe, dementia
and related illnesses such as Parkinson's leave the victim without the
ability to manage even daily expenditures, much less an IRA. It is an odd
form of retirement planning indeed to pin the hopes of financial security
during retirement on individually managed IRAs, knowing as we do, that a
significant percentage of those IRA owners will lose the mental ability to
manage those accounts due to dementia. Of course, millions of recipients
of pensions will also become demented and lose the ability to handle a
monthly pension check. But the risk to a pension recipient is much less.
Even if the monthly pension check is lost or misused, another check will
arrive next month. But if a demented IRA owner makes investments that
result in significant financial losses, there is no additional money coming to
the rescue.

38

2000).

THE MERCK MANUAL OF GERIATRICS 357 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 3rd ed.
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The financial risks to an IRA owner during the early stages of
progressive dementia are very great. Dementia or a similar loss of
executive functioning can arise from several sources, but the two most
prevalent are Alzheimer's and vascular (multi-infarct) dementia.
Alzheimer's, the most common form of dementia, is a progressive and
irreversible condition that eventually leads to death.3 9 Vascular dementia,
the second most common cause of dementia, is caused by one or more
mini-strokes in the brain. While vascular dementia is not necessarily
progressive, often the individual experiences additional strokes with a
resulting additional loss of mental capacity. The loss of capacity is patchy,
as some forms of cognition are unaffected, but the strokes can also cause
the loss of physical capability. 4 0 The decline in both mental and physical
capacity can potentially seriously diminish an individual's ability to
effectively manage an IRA.
Whether caused by Alzheimer's or vascular strokes, in its early
stages dementia is often not diagnosed. Although some victims of
dementia are aware that something is amiss, most do not understand or
appreciate that they are losing mental capacity, or they fail to understand
the extent of the loss. One of the tragedies of dementia is that it robs its
victim of self-awareness and self-judgment. Dementia often waxes and
wanes so that the individual may experience times of awareness and realize
that they cannot remember some obvious past event or they failed to
recognize a good friend on the previous day. But this interval of awareness
rarely leads to individuals admitting that they are in mental decline and
taking steps to assure that their finances are protected.
Family and friends of individuals with early stages or mild
dementia frequently misread it as merely as normal memory loss associated
with aging. During the early stages of the disease, the victim can often
cover for the deficits; rather than engaging in a conversation, they reply
with timeworn cliches or phrases that give the appearance of someone who
may be less engaged with the world but is still of sound mind. Some
observers perceive the loss of executive functioning as a sign of normal
aging or else assume that the older person is merely confused by modem
life and new circumstances. Often family members do not want to admit
that a parent or spouse is suffering from dementia, and essentially deny the
39 For a detailed discussion of the causes and symptoms of Alzheimer's
disease, see JAMES E. SPAR & ASENATH LA RUE, CLINICAL MANUAL OF GERIATRIC

PSYCHIATRY, 173-220 (2006).

oId. at 242-48.
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obvious signs. It seems better to laugh off the confusion and memory loss,
which waxes and wanes, and claim that "Mom has good days and bad
days," and hope that it is not a progressive condition.
It is during the early stages of dementia that the individual is at
particular risk of making misguided decisions about an IRA. Because no
one may be aware of the degree of the loss of capacity, the IRA owner will
continue to make investment and distribution decisions without anyone
raising an objection or intervening. The financial advisor may disagree
with IRA owner's decisions, but, absent understanding that the decisions
arise from a diminished capacity, the advisor will merely assume that the
client has poor judgment. Worse, the individual with early or mild
dementia is very vulnerable to financial exploitation and abuse because the
loss of capacity leaves the individual less capable of perceiving poor advice
or spotting a conflict of interest. The loss of capacity also typically results
in the individual being much more susceptible to advice, suggestions and
even undue influence from third parties or unreliable sources, such as
financial commentators on television or on internet sites. Even family
members may take advantage of a confused, forgetful individual suffering
from mild dementia by asking for gifts, requesting money for their own
investment or business schemes, or even becoming the chief investment
advisor (for a fee, of course).
How many IRA owners suffer from some degree of dementia and
how much harm that has caused to their accounts is unknown. But
statistically we know that millions of older IRA owners have dementia, and
we also know that individuals with dementia make poorer decisions and are
vulnerable to poor or exploitive advice. So it follows that millions of IRA
owners are making poor investment decisions. For an IRA owner not to
take steps to assure effective management of the IRA in the event that he or
she loses mental capacity reflects a failure to plan for a fairly likely
eventuality.
VI.

THE LIMITATIONS OF GUARDIANSHIP AND POWERS OF
ATTORNEY

The inability of many older individuals to handle their financial
affairs has led to the reliance on substituted decision makers: court
appointed guardians and agents acting under a power of attorney.
Unfortunately, both have serious drawbacks.
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A. GUARDIANS
Every state has a guardianship statute that permits a judicial
determination that an individual is legally incapacitated and in need of a
guardian. Guardianship (called conservatorship in some states) has long
been the state response to attempt to protect those who lack mental
capacity.4' At present, the typical statutory test of legal incapacity is the
inability of an individual to make reasonable decisions. 4 2 If an individual is
found to lack mental capacity, the court is empowered to appoint a
guardian (or conservator) to act as a substitute decision-maker for the
incapacitated individual. The standard of proof of mental incapacity is
high because states do not wish to override individuals' autonomy even if
they are less mentally capable than they once were or even if they are
making questionable financial decisions. Consequently, an IRA owner
with diminished capacity might not qualify for the appointment of a
guardian even though, because of the loss of mental capacity, his or her
investment decisions have been questionable and result in financial losses.
Assuming, however, that a court finds the individual to be
mentally incapacitated, the court has the authority to strip the individual of
the right to manage an IRA, and all other assets, and appoint a guardian to
take over management of the IRA as well as the individual's other assets.
The court will grant the guardian sufficient authority to carry out its
assigned duties, but usually will not instruct the guardian as to how it
should carry out its responsibilities, such as managing an IRA. A guardian
is assumed to be capable of protecting the assets of the incapacitated person
in an efficient and sensible manner, though a guardian may be subject to
some statutory instructions or limitations. Often, for example, a guardian
has the authority to spend the income of the incapacitated individual, but
must ask the court for authority to spend capital.
Most states expect a guardian to make that decision in accordance
with the doctrine of substituted judgment, which requires the guardian to
attempt to do what the incapacitated person would have done but for the
incapacity. 43 The guardian is expected to attempt to ascertain what the
41See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship:An Analysis, A
Critique and a Proposalfor Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1981).
42 E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 30.1-26-01 (amended 2010).
43 Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making
Standardsfor Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REv. 1491, 1494
(2012).
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incapacitated person would have done on the basis of his or her prior oral
or written statements, any relevant instructions or comments made to
financial advisors or others, and by the pattern of prior decisions. For
example, if the incapacitated person had invested the IRA exclusively in
bonds and eschewed stocks, under substituted judgment, the guardian
should continue that investment allocation. Similarly, the guardian should
continue to make distributions from the IRA at the same level as in prior
years unless the needs of the incapacitated person or his or her spouse
suggest larger annual distributions would be appropriate.
The guardian is accountable to the appointing court, perhaps in the
form of annual reports, but the level of judicial supervision is usually
minimal and largely ineffective because of limited court resources.44 It is
also not clear how courts expect a guardian to manage an IRA. For
example, is a guardian permitted to distribute more than the minimally
required annual distribution without prior court approval? The answer
likely varies from state to state and may vary from court to court within a
state. Guardians, in short, are usually left to their own devices; whether
that results in optimal choices about IRA investments and distributions is
doubtful.
Guardianship has other drawbacks.
The imposition of a
guardianship may not be possible even though an individual has diminished
capacity, because the appointment of a guardian can only occur if the
individual meets the state's statutory test of incapacity. State standards of
when a guardian can be appointed are deliberately set fairly high because
the state is naturally hesitant to strip an individual of the right to control his
or her life. It is thought better to permit individuals with reduced capacity
to continue to manage their own affairs so long as they are not putting
either themselves or their property at serious risk of harm. Thus, for
example, just because an IRA owner puts the funds in more risky
investments or comes under the sway of an new financial advisor whose
views are out of the mainstream, is not reason enough to impose a
guardianship since many IRA owners, who have with no loss of capacity,
invest their funds in high risk investments or rely on controversial
investment advice.

Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National
Survey of CourtPractices,37 STETSON L. REv. 143, 185 (2007).
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Even if the court finds the requisite incapacity and approves a
guardian, the individual appointed as guardian may lack the knowledge or
skill to be an effective manager of an IRA. Typically, the court appoints as
guardian the individual nominated in the petition that was filed seeking the
imposition of a guardianship. The ability of the individual nominated to
wisely manage a retirement IRA undoubtedly varies greatly. Often those
nominated are selected more for their willingness and availability to act as
guardian rather than for any special financial acumen. Worse, the
individual who agrees to act as guardian may agree to do so from a desire
to gain some advantage or profit from the assets of the older person rather
than using the IRA to promote the interests of the incapacitated person. 45
B. AGENTS
Because of the costs, complexities, and lack of privacy associated
with guardianship, every state has a statute that permits an individual to
create a durable power of attorney that appoints an agent to handle
financial affairs in the event the principal should be unable to do so. The
use of a power of attorney would seem to be the sensible and efficient
solution to an older retiree losing the ability to handle a retirement IRA. It
is inexpensive because most powers of attorney are based on a form or a
standard document, and can be seen as something akin to a private
guardianship arrangement, with the agent being comparable to a guardian.
The agent takes on his or her duties when the principal is no longer capable
of managing his or her financial affairs. There is no judicial involvement
involved. The appointment of an agent under a power of attorney is a
private solution to a private problem.
Unfortunately, despite the wide use of the durable powers of
attorney, no state has succeeded in preventing the misuse of that power by
the agent." Absent requirements in the power that mandate oversight or
preapproval of an agent's actions, agents are essentially on their own. As
a result, an agent can manage the financial affairs of the principal as the
agent sees fit. Without any on-going oversight, who is to know if the agent
" Alison Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional Guardians, 31
STETSON L. REV. 941, 956 (2002).

See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship:
Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REv. 8 (2007).
1 Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden
Abuses ofDurable Powers ofAttorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 18 (2006).
46
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is dutifully carrying out his or her responsibilities? The agent is, to be sure,
a fiduciary and held to the duty of loyalty and the obligation to avoid
conflicts of interest and self-dealing, but how the agent is to make decisions
is less clear. 8 Most states require the guardian to act in accord with
substituted judgment, that is, to do what the incapacitated person would
have done, although some states expect the agent to act in the best interests
of the principal. 4 9 The latter presumably allows an agent to ignore the
expressed wishes of the principal or the previous pattern of decisions by the
principal if those decisions do not appear to be the best way to further the
principal's financial interest. That has the advantage that an agent acting
according to the best interest standard can ignore what the principal might
have said or done in the period when the principal might have been
suffering from a decline in capacity, though before the loss was sufficient
to permit the agent to take control. Even states that insist upon the
application of substituted judgment permit an agent to ignore what the
principal would have wished if the agent believes that to do so would not
be in the principal's best interest.o In the end, how an agent acts may not
differ much whether the state standard is one of substituted judgment or
best interest; the agent will do what the principal would have done unless it
does not seem in the best interest of the principal to do so.
Of course, that is the point of a power of attorney - to create
powers in the agent that are very similar to the legal rights of the principal.
Unfortunately, that wide grant of authority makes it easy for an agent to
perform poorly in managing an IRA even though carrying out his or her
duties in a lawful manner.
The initial challenge for the agent is to intelligently invest the IRA
assets. Probably, many agents do what is easiest, which is to do nothing
and leave the assets invested as they found them. Maintaining the status
quo is an attractive option. When faced with whether to act or do nothing,
individuals usually prefer to stay the course rather than to make any
changes because a lost opportunity is more easily overlooked and forgotten
as compared with doing something that proves to be a mistake." The
Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of
FiduciaryRelationships, 36 GA. L. REv. 1, 27 (2001).
49 See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a FinancialDurable Power
ofAttorney: An UnscriptedRole, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574 (1996).
50 Whitton &Frolik, supra note
43, at 1499.
51 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 675 (1998).
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preference for the status quo and the desire to avoid losses when faced with
uncertain alternatives is well documented in psychological studies. 5 2 So it
is to be expected that an agent, unless quite confident in his or her
investment skills, may choose to leave the asset allocation as is. Changing
investments opens the agent to the possibility that the new investments will
perform less well than the old investments would have if they had not been
abandoned. That underperformance is a natural test to apply to the new
investments. In contrast, the wisdom of not changing the investments is
difficult to judge because it is unclear as to which possible alternative
investment choice the status quo should be measured against. Suppose that
when the agent took control from an incapacitated IRA owner, the IRA was
invested forty percent in stocks and sixty percent in bonds. An agent, who
maintained that asset allocation, could not be criticized because that is a
common and defensible allocation of IRA assets. If, however, the agent
changed the allocation to eighty percent bonds and twenty percent stocks, it
is easy to measure the return of stocks over the next year and observe
whether the retreat from stocks was a good decision; that is, the most
profitable choice. If stocks had soared in value, it would seem that the
agent made a mistake even though, to be fair, the wisdom of the decision to
sell stocks and buy bonds should have been judged at the time of the stocks
were sold and not in hindsight.
The maintenance of the status quo also fulfills the requirement of
substituted judgment by doing what the principal apparently would have
done. Doing so, however, assumes that the prior acts of the principal
represented decisions made when the principal was fully in command of his
or her mental facilities. In many instances, however, that will not be the
case. The principal's mental incapacity might have been the result of a
swift and dramatic debilitating illness, but it is far more likely that the
principal's capacity was a gradual decline and that he or she continued to
manage the IRA while suffering from diminished capacity. And during
that period of time, the principal may have made investment decisions that
did not represent the "true" intent of the principal; that is, the principal at
full mental capacity. Obviously, no agent should feel bound by substituted
judgment to carry out decisions made by a principal, who suffered from
reduced capacity. Given that the agent cannot know when the principal
began to lose capacity, and so which past decisions reflect a reduced level
See e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
52
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of incapacity, an agent should be hesitant to apply substituted judgment to
the management of an IRA.
An agent, if not bound by substituted judgment, necessarily must
apply the best interest test and manage the IRA in a manner that best
promotes the principal's interests, presumably both financial and personal.
That dictate, however, presents a number of difficulties for a conscientious
agent.
The agent must manage the IRA in a manner that will maximize
returns commensurate with an acceptable level of risk. While maintaining a
proper return/risk balance is difficult for any investor, an agent managing
an IRA, faces the additional obligation of serving the best interest of the
principal, which is an almost impossible task because there is no simple
metric that tells the agent whether any particular investment strategy meets
that obligation. If the agent errs on the side of lower risk, the investment
return will suffer, and that in turn will either mean smaller distributions in
the future, and so a diminished quality of life for the principal, or an IRA of
a lesser value to pass on the principal's heirs. Of course, the agent has no
way of knowing whether the principal is better served by lower investment
returns but less risk, or whether the principal would be better off if the
agent took greater risks and so achieved greater investment returns. Taking
greater risks could either mean greater distributions or a larger IRA to pass
on to heirs, but could also mean a loss of capital and so lower returns in the
future.
Not only do investment decisions present difficulties for an agent;
so do distributions. An agent, when making IRA distributions beyond
those mandated by the minimum distribution rules, must look to the quality
of life of the principal with an eye towards balancing present and future
needs.
An increase in distributions today may result in smaller
distributions in the future, and also dictates taking greater investment risks
in order to support continued large distributions in the future. The agent,
who must make decisions in an ever-changing investment climate, must
also make distributions with due consideration of the possibility that the
principal's financial needs may be increasing as his or her physical and
mental condition declines.
It should be apparent, then, that even a dedicated, conscientious
agent will find it difficult to manage an IRA. Many individuals, no matter
how well intentioned, will not be up to the task. They will lack the
investment acumen and sophistication required to successfully handle
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investments of a fund from which annual distributions are being made.53
They will also be unable to determine the appropriate amount of
distributions in light of the tension between the current and future needs of
the principal. The interplay of investment choices, distribution decisions, a
fluid investment landscape, and the changing needs of a physically and
mentally declining principal will be beyond the ability of most agents.
The inability of the typical agent to effectively manage an IRA is
also a result of who the principal is likely to appoint as agent. Usually, in
order of priority, principals name their spouse, next an adult child, and
finally a more distant relation. None of these individuals are selected
because they are financially sophisticated or skilled at managing an IRA;
rather, they are named because they are someone the principal trusts and
who are willing to serve as an agent. Overwhelmingly, principals name
spouses and children as agents, in part because the principal does not
realize how difficult it can be for an agent to manage the principal's
financial affairs, particularly if the principal owns a rollover IRA.
Additionally, even if the individual who was named agent made
sense at the time the power of attorney was executed, that appointment
might not be a wise choice by the time the agent actually takes over for the
incapacitated principal. For example, at age seventy, the IRA owner
named his sixty-nine-year-old wife as agent, but when he became
incapacitated at age eighty-six, she was eighty-five and beginning to suffer
some mild loss of memory. Will she be mentally sharp enough in the
coming years to successfully manage his IRA account? What of the
seventy-five-year-old woman who named her fifty-three-year-old daughter
as agent, but did not become incapacitated until age ninety when her
daughter was sixty-eight and undergoing intensive treatment for lung
cancer? Is the daughter really going to be capable of handling her mother's
IRA? Or consider a seventy-five-year-old man who names his twenty-fiveyear-old nephew as his agent. Ten years later, when the principal needs his
agent to take over the principal's finances, the now thirty-five-year-old
nephew has just filed for bankruptcy after he lost his job, had his house
foreclosed and is in the midst of a bitter divorce, not exactly the person the
eighty-five-year-old principal would now choose to act as his agent.
53 Financial literacy varies considerably. Some agents may be quite capable;
others much less so. One study found that individuals with less education and less
wealth have a lower level of financial sophistication and are prone to making more

investment errors. Laurent E. Calvet et al., Measuring the FinancialSophistication
ofHouseholds, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 393, 397-98 (2009).
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Even if the agent is not suffering from health or financial problems,
there is no reason to suppose that most agents will be effective at managing
an IRA. When managing an IRA, an agent has incentives and motivations
that are not the same as those of the principal, which result in classic
"agency costs." 54 Unlike the principal, who has a financial stake in the
management of the IRA, the agent does not. If the agent is paid, it will be
by the hour with little regard to the quality of the agent's performance. The
many agents who are not compensated are motivated by love, concern, and
a sense of responsibility; none of which may translate into effective
management of the principal's IRA. Agents may in fact be less capable
because they are not dealing with their own money and the quality of their
own life is not affected by their decisions. Although the agent may want to
make decisions that best promote the interest of the principal, it is unlikely
that an agent will devote as much time and energy in managing the IRA as
would the principal. That lack of self-interest alone is likely enough to
mean less effective management of the IRA by the agent, even assuming
the agent has skills comparable to the principal.
In some cases, third parties may bring pressure to bear on the
agent. Those who are the beneficiaries of the IRA after the principal's
death may urge greater or lesser risk taking in the IRA investments as a
way of protecting their expected future inheritance. Or they may advise the
agent to minimize distributions in order to increase their inheritance. For
example, if the principal needs daily assistance, the question may anise as
to whether to purchase daily attendant care in the principal's home or elect
more economical housing in an assisted living facility. Whether the agent
is willing to pay for expensive personal care may depend on the agent's
relation to the principal. An agent, who is the spouse of the principal, may
choose to pay for personal care, while an adult child, with an eye to his or
her inheritance, may think assisted living is a more sensible choice.
If the agent stands to inherit the IRA, the conflict of interest is
obvious and real; yet the selection of an adult child as agent is
understandable, though still unfortunate. How an agent responds to a
conflict of interest may depend on the agent's relative financial status and
how much the agent is looking forward to inheriting a well-funded IRA.
5

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:

ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,

308-10 (1976). For an analysis of why a trustee's relation to a settlor exhibits
agency costs, see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89
CORNELL

L. REv. 621, 624 (2004).
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The agent is a fiduciary and so should resolve any conflict in favor of the
principal or resign as agent. In reality, however, an agent's decisions as to
the management of an IRA are likely to be within the zone of the agent's
discretion and so are not obvious violations of the agent's fiduciary duty.
Even if the agent fails to meet his or her fiduciary obligations, absent a
rather obvious transgression and someone who is willing to object, the
agent will not be called to account.
Beyond the honest but marginally competent agent are those who
misuse, abuse or steal the principal's assets. In the past, agents have made
inappropriate gifts to third parties, made inappropriate gifts to themselves,
made gifts to charities not favored by the principal, defeated estate plans by
creating joint accounts with survivorship interests, changed beneficiaries
named in life insurance contracts, revoked trusts, engaged in self-dealing,
and used their powers to benefit their spouses, friends or relatives. In short,
agents routinely violate their fiduciary obligations and use their authority to
advance their own interests at the expense of the principal.
If the agent misuses or wastes the assets in the IRA, the elderly
IRA owner will not only be incapacitated but may also be impoverished.
Of course, an elderly IRA owner will try to select a trustworthy person to
act as agent, and most probably succeed in doing so, but not all will make
the right choice.
An aging owner of a retirement IRA who is losing the ability to
manage it faces the alternative of accepting guardianship or appointing an
agent under a durable power of attorney, neither of which assures proper
management of the IRA. This is the world that our nation's retirement
system has created for its elderly. The reliance on 401(k) plans has been
rightly criticized for leaving retirees with inadequate savings for their
retirement. Many have attacked 401(k) accounts for putting the investment
risk on employees who in general are not up to the burden. 6 But even those
employees who arrive at retirement having adequately managed their
account and have an account with enough money to create a financially
secure retirement must still navigate the perilous years of their retirement.
" See generally Jennifer L. Rhein, No One In Charge: Durable Powers of
Attorney and the Failure to Protect IncapacitatedPersons, 17 ELDER L.J. 165

(2009) (describing how agents acting under durable powers of attorney agreements
can exploit incapacitated principals).
56 Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees to Direct
the Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 365

(2005).
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Like a modem Odysseus, they must successfully navigate a long and
difficult voyage.
VII.

ANNUITIES

Because of the difficulties of post-retirement management of a
rollover IRA, some hope to recreate the advantages of the defined benefit
pension by encouraging retirees to convert some or all of their IRA into an
immediate pay, lifetime annuity. Doing so would address the two
significant risks created for retirees - financial management and longevity.
A. RECREATING THE ADVANTAGES OF A DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN
The owner of an IRA can capture many of the advantages of the
pensions offered by defined benefit plans by converting some or all of the
account into an annuity. Merely investing half of the account can
dramatically increase the probability that the retiree will not outlive the
IRA.' The purchase of a lifetime annuity eliminates the need to manage
the investment of those funds, determining which assets should be used to
fund distributions, and the fear of zeroing out the fund prior to death. At
present, only twenty percent of defined contribution plans offer retirees the
option of converting their accounts into an annuity, and only about ten
percent of the employees of those plans choose the annuity option. Even if
an annuity is available as part of the 401(k) plan, retirees typically prefer a
lump-sum distribution to an annuity.5 9 Interestingly, retirees who
participate in defined benefit plans often have the option of accepting a
pension, which can be thought of as an annuity, or accepting a lump-sum
distribution. Although some do elect to take the lump sum, the rate of
those who choose the pension do so at a much higher rate than those with
defined contribution accounts elect to convert them into an annuity.
Apparently, both those expecting pensions and those anticipating the

1 See generally Frolik, supra note 7 (arguing that federally guaranteed
annuities for retirees paid for by 401(k) accounts would provide a more secure
method of extending retirement savings).
5 Walter Updegrave, Make Your Dough Last and Last... and Last, 38 MONEY
92, 94 (Oct. 2009).
59 Steven D. Cohen, Note, Autoenrollment and Annuitization: Enabling401(k)
"DB-ation," 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 281, 317 (2009).
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receipt of a lump sum prefer to stay with the status quo.60 For most retirees,
exchanging a lifetime of accumulated retirement investment, a very large
figure, for periodic annuity benefits, a much smaller figure, is not an
appealing tradeoff.61

A variety of structural reforms are needed to encourage the
purchase of annuities. No one reform is going to drastically change the
current retiree reluctance to purchase annuities, but in combination, they
could begin to change their attitudes. What is needed is a sense by retirees
that annuitizing at least part of their rollover IRA is presumptively the
intelligent thing to do. We need to reach the point where a retiree feels the
need to justify not buying an annuity rather than retirees believing, as they
do today, that keeping a lump sum distribution in an IRA is the more
sensible approach.
Perhaps many retirees reject annuities because they think of an
annuity as an investment rather than the insurance product that it is. 62 The
purchase of an immediate pay, lifetime annuity is the purchase of a stream
of income, to be sure, but it is better understood as a "guarantee" of income
for life.63 The value of the product is not just the benefits that it pays, but
more importantly the assurance of a lifetime of income. An annuity
provides a relatively risk-free means of converting capital - the cost of the
annuity - into disposable income without fear of exhausting the fund. The
insurance value of the annuity is fulfilled no matter when the annuitant dies
and the benefit payments cease. Even if an annuitant dies before his or her
actuarially projected date of death, he or she does not "lose." Someone
who buys fire insurance has not "lost" if there is no fire and no
compensation is paid, because it is avoidance of the risk of loss that was the
motivation for the purchase. In the case of an annuity, it is the guarantee of
a lifetime of income that justifies its acquisition.

60

Shlomo Benartzi et al., Annuitization Puzzles, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 156

(2011).

Robert Gazzale et al., Do Default and Longevity Annuities Improve Annuity
Take-Up Rates? Results from an Experiment, 11 AARP PUB. POL'Y INST. 10, 1061

11 (Oct. 2012).
62 See Benartzi et al., supra note
60, at 156.
63 The "guarantee" of course is only as good as the
financial strength of the
seller of the annuity. Those who purchase annuities, however, assume that the
seller will in fact pay the annuity as promised. It is difficult to believe that any
annuitant who had doubts about the certainty of payment would buy an annuity.
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Unfortunately, too often those who buy annuities think that they
must outlive their expected date of death to avoid "losing" the bet with the
seller of the annuity. To overcome the perceived "gamble" of buying an
annuity, an agent, who is selling the annuity, points out that the annuity
protects buyers who outlive their life expectancy from outliving their
savings. What the agent may not realize is that most individuals
underestimate how long they will live. The agent who points out to sixtyfive-year-olds that if they live longer than their twenty year life expectancy,
they will reap a windfall (actually merely a modestly higher rate of return
on the investment, i.e. the cost of the annuity) fails to realize that many
potential buyers do not expect to live for another twenty years and so fear
that they will never realize that windfall. Moreover, because of the
tendency of individuals to hyper-discount future income, even if the
potential buyers expect to live long enough to get the windfall, they greatly
undervalue it. The combination of underestimating the likelihood of living
past their projected life expectancy and undervaluing the payoff if they do,
naturally causes many to avoid annuities, which they perceive as very
likely resulting in a large "loss" (the cost of the annuity) and a smaller
chance of a small gain (the payments continuing on past their life
expectancy). Given that many see an annuity as being more likely to result
in a perceived, if not a real, loss, and given that most individuals fear losses
more than they appreciate gains, it is small wonder that annuities are not
attractive to most retirees.65
For many, annuities are also unattractive because they limit the
ability to leave a financial legacy. They look at the total value of an IRA,
and underestimating how long they will live, assume that they will be able
to leave most, if not all of that IRA, to their children. They cannot
imagine giving up that legacy by purchasing an annuity regardless of the
advantages of doing so. To a remarkable degree, the elderly are willing to
64

Most who purchase annuities try to reduce the risk of an early death

resulting in a "loss" by purchasing an annuity with a tern certain payout period.
For example, the annuity might guarantee a minimum payout of ten years. Hu &
Scott, supra note 29, at 77.
65 Jeffery R. Brown et al., Why Don't People Insure Late-Life Consumption?A
Framing Explanation of the Under Annuitization Puzzle, 98 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 304, 304-05 (2008).
66 This description holds true whether the IRA owner is single or married. If
the latter, then the expectation is that the IRA will be intact at the death of the
second to die of the spouses and the IRA owner.
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forego consumption in order to preserve their assets so that they can pass
them on, usually to their children. While the children and their financial
advisors may urge the older person to spend more on themselves, to "live a
little," that advice is often not heeded because many elderly are determined
to preserve their capital for their heirs.
Even financially sophisticated retirees who understand the
advantages of annuities may not buy them for fear that the seller of the
annuity might find itself unable to pay the annuity. Other potential
purchasers may be willing to bear the modest risk of possible nonpayment,
but may be reluctant to buy annuities because of the fear of rising interest
rates. A reasonable fear of the annuity purchaser is that interest rates (as
well as investment returns in general) will rise after the annuity has been
purchased, leaving the annuitant locked into an annuity whose payments
are low because they are based on projected lower interest rates.
Similarly, because sellers of annuities also invest in stocks, a general rise in
the stock market after the purchase of an annuity may mean that the
purchaser, by waiting a few months and realizing more on the sale of his or
her stocks, could have bought a larger annuity.
The possible rise in annuity payment rates is one reason some
advocate buying more than one annuity and spacing out the purchases over
a few years. Known as "laddering," the strategy may backfire if future
annuity payments decline because of lower interest rates or a decline in the
value of stocks, but it does have the advantage of averaging annuity
payments over several years and so avoiding extremely low payments,
albeit at the potential cost of not locking in higher payments. Laddering
also protects against investing a significant portion of assets into a single
lifetime annuity that does not have a minimum payout period, and dying
soon thereafter. By laddering, or deferring the investment of some funds
targeted for the purchase of an annuity, the individual may die before
having invested all of the value of the IRA in annuities.
To overcome potential purchasers' fears that they may die early in
the payout period, annuities are often sold with minimum payout periods,
with 10 years being common. Of course, a minimum payout period lowers
the annual payout, but for many purchasers the trade-off is worth it. Other
annuities guarantee a back-pay equal to the initial purchase price. If the
The seller of the annuity will invest the purchase price. The benefits paid by
the annuity will vary based upon the projected investment return anticipated by the
seller. If interest rates are low, the seller has to assume a lower rate of investment
return.
67
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annuitant dies before that occurs, the annuity continues to pay until it has
paid back the purchase price, but of course at the cost of a lower annual
payment. Simply put, the more an annuity varies from the "pure product"
of a lifetime guarantee without any minimum payment guaranty, the lower
the annual payment but the more it appeals to purchasers who are not
comfortable with the prospect of dying long before their projected life
expectancy.
For those apprehensive about whether the seller of the annuity will
be financially secure enough to pay the annuity, one solution is to buy
smaller annuities from several annuity sellers, thereby spreading the risk.
If one seller should fail, only a portion of the total annuity payments would
be lost.
Another possibility is to purchase a deferred annuity with a fixed
payout.6 " For example, a 65-year-old buys an annuity for $X that will pay
$Y per year for life, but the initial payment will not begin for 10 years
(when the purchaser is age 75). Depending on the annuity, it may pay back
some, or all, of the purchase price if the annuitant dies before reaching age
seventy-five. The advantage to the annuitant is that for $X purchase price,
the annuitant realizes a significantly larger annual payment than by paying
the same amount for an immediate pay annuity. 69 During the intervening
ten years, the annuitant can draw down his or her savings knowing that, at
age seventy-five, a new stream of income will appear. Some advocate
dividing the retirement savings that the retiree expects to spend during
retirement - not including savings that are being held back to pass on to
heirs - into two equal parts: buying an annuity to begin at age 80, and then
spending the other half during the years leading up to age 80. The delay in
the start of the annuity will result in a higher annual payment, and the
certainty of the forthcoming income permits the annuitant to "selfannuitize" the other half of the savings over the years leading up to age 80.

68

Jonathan Barry Forman, Optimal Distribution Rules for Defined

Contribution Plans: What Can the United States and Australia Learn from Other
Countries?, in N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BEN, & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 3-1, 3-28

(Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2012).
69 In February of 2012, the purchase of a deferred annuity for $100,000 by a
sixty-five-year-old male with the first payment to begin at age seventy-five paid
about $11,650 a year. If the annuity was deferred until age eighty-five, the yearly
payment was about $25,450 per year. Calculations are taken from id. at 3-29.
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POSSIBLE REFORMS TO ENCOURAGE THE PURCHASE OF ANNUITIES

The first step is to mandate that all 401(k) plans offer an annuity
option and require all rollover IRAs to permit the owner to purchase an
annuity without recognition of immediate income. 70 As a practical matter,
the use of IRA funds to purchase an annuity without being taxed on the
purchase price should be time limited, perhaps to the first year after the
rollover into the IRA. Of course, the entire amount of the annuity is be
taxed as ordinary income; the exclusion ratio provided in section seventytwo of the IRC does not apply to annuities purchased with funds that were
never subject to the income tax.
Unless the government does something to encourage the use of
annuities by IRA owners, the financial security of many retirees will be
severely compromised in the years to come. We can expect unacceptable
rates of elderly poverty and increasing elderly financial exploitation and
abuse. To overcome the reluctance of retirees to purchase annuities, the
federal government could create, sell, and likely subsidize new forms of
annuities for retirees who have a rollover IRA.7 No one would be required
to purchase an annuity from the government, but if the annuities were
attractive enough, many retirees might be inclined to purchase them.
A public entity that sold annuities (fully backed by the federal
government) would overcome retiree fears about the financial solvency of
the issuer of the annuity. So that government would not compete generally
with issuers of annuities, the entity should be limited to selling annuities to
retirees who pay for it with funds from their 401(k) or a rollover IRA.
Such an entity should be able to sell an attractively priced annuity in part
because of savings in the form of lower administrative costs, the lack of the
need to advertise, and savings from not paying commissions to sellers of
the annuities, as well as not being burdened with the need to create a profit.
To meet the concern of annuity purchasers that they might be
buying the annuity when interest rates were too low, the annuities could be
tied to a rolling, five-year interest rate based on the interest rate of U.S.
Treasury notes. The pension paid to those who participate in a defined
benefit plan is not dependent on the prevailing interest rates at the time of
the employee's retirement. Similarly, employees who participate in 401(k)
plans should have the opportunity to convert their 401(k) accounts into a
70 A more radical solution would be to require retirees with 401(k) accounts to

purchase annuities. See id. at 3-32.
71 Frolik, supra note 7, at
278.
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stream of income that is not wholly dependent on the rate of interest
prevailing at the time of their retirement. Perhaps some form of postpurchase protection in the form of a higher payout if interest rates rise
appreciably might be a solution. The annuities might also offer modest
inflation protection. The monthly payout could be increased by a certain
percentage in the event that the increase in the consumer price index
exceeded a predetermined trigger level. While not offering the complete
inflation protection enjoyed by Social Security recipients, whose annual
benefit rises with inflation, the partial protection would encourage the
purchase of annuities by those who are wary of locking their capital into a
fixed income investment.7 2
Of course, the more protection offered by the annuities, the more
they would cost unless some or all of those protections were subsidized by
the government. The justification for a subsidy is the public interest in
assisting retirees who participated in defined contribution plans to use,
enjoy and create lifetime, assured streams of income. For years the nation
has promoted employer provided retirement plans by providing generous
deferral of income taxes on 401(k) accounts. Modestly extending that
subsidy to the post-employment years would not seem excessive.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The assumption that retirees can successfully manage their IRAs
during their declining years is a folly. Why any society would willfully
create a retirement system that relies on the financial acumen of millions of
aging individuals can only be explained as the triumph of hope over
common sense and reality. Unless we relieve retirees of the burden of the
responsibility for their retirement assets, we can expect growing poverty
among the elderly as they mismanage and spend down their retirement
funds.
It is time to admit that what most retirees need is a stream of
income. Our nation's retirees need and deserve the security of having a
check arrive every month that does not depend upon their skill at managing
an IRA during their declining years.

See id. at 320-30 (discussing ways the government could encourage the
purchase of annuities).
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